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Demographic change in industrial countries will influence educational spending in potentially 
two ways. On the one hand, the decline in the number of school-age children should alleviate 
the financial pressure. On the other hand, the theoretical/empirical literature has established 
that the concomitantly increasing proportion of elderly in the population can influence the 
propensity of politicians to spend on education. Using a panel of the Swiss Cantons for the 
period from 1990 to 2002, we find that the education system has exhibited little elasticity in 
adjusting to changes in the school-age population, and that the share of the elderly population 
has a significantly negative influence on the willingness to spend on public education. 
JEL Code: H72, I22, J18. 







University of Bern 
Switzerland 
Stefan C. Wolter 
Swiss Coordination Center for Research 










   2 
Introduction 
 
Like most other industrialized countries, Switzerland is in the midst of profound 
demographic change. Its stagnating and soon shrinking residential population will 
also lead to a declining number of school-age children. The effects of the decline 
in the number of pupils on education finance are therefore of interest. Two known 
effects from the theoretical and empirical literature will be specifically analyzed. 
First, the response of the education system to a decline in the student population is 
analyzed, i.e. as to whether a proportional decline in education spending can be 
expected  given  a  decline  in  the  school-age  population.  The  hope  has  been 
expressed  in  educational  policy-making  circles  that  this  (expected)  relief  on 
education budgets might be utilized to finance greater spending on other areas of 
the education system. Secondly, we analyze whether the trend of an increasing 
elderly population (almost parallel to the shrinking school-age population) does 
not have a negative influence on the willingness of the general public to spend 
money on public education. The preferences and needs of the older population 
differ  in  comparison  with  the  younger  population  so  the  existence  of such  an 
effect could certainly be conjectured.  
 
Empirically,  this  study  makes  use  of  the  fact  that  Switzerland  consists  of  26 
Cantons  empowered  with  the  political  authority  to  organize  and  operate  their 
particular  system  of  education  and  that  the  Cantons  also  provide  most  of  the 
financing for their Cantonal education systems. Similar to US studies, this set of 
data is suitable for conducting empirical analyses over a relatively short period of 
time because panel estimates permit a sufficiently high number of observations to 
be made.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 gives some basic information on the 
demographic situation in Switzerland. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
current theoretical and empirical literature from economic and political science 
literature  that  can  be  referred  to  for  comparative  purposes.  The  third  section 
deduces the hypotheses and issues that merit further analysis. The data used is 
presented in the next section and section 5 shows the empirical evaluations of the 
data. The sixth section presents the estimated effects of the results on education 
finance during the next ten years. The conclusions drawn in regards to education 
policy are given in the final section. 
 
 
Demographic change in Switzerland and its consequences for the education 
system 
 
The ongoing demographic change is primarily distinguished by two aspects that 
are relevant to the present paper.  First, the growth rate of the Swiss population, 
which more than doubled between 1900 and 2000, has slowed substantially in 
recent  years,  notwithstanding  a  sustained  inflow  of  immigrants.  According  to 
demographic projections, Switzerland’s population will shrink during the coming 
decades.    3 
This slowdown in population growth is mainly attributable to significantly lower 
birth rates. In 1960 women in Switzerland had an average of 2.44 children; in 
2002 this had declined to 1.39.  
 
Secondly, the demographic pyramid has been deprived of its base owing to the 
lower birth rates, i.e. the number of young people is shrinking more quickly than 
the general population.  At the top of the pyramid, however, the population is 
growing, not least due to the steady increase in life expectancy. The average life 
expectancy of Swiss men and women has risen to 77.9 and 83 years, respectively, 
over the past 50 years. At the beginning of the last century more than 40% of the 
population was younger than 20 and only about 6% was older than the current 
retirement age, whereas today these two segments of the population have shifted 
to such an extent that the under 20 year-olds now account for 22% of the total 
population and approximately one-sixth of the population is older than 65. 
 
In  summary,  demographic  change  in  Switzerland  is  leading  to  a  declining 
absolute number of young people and a consequential shift in the age structure of 
the residential population, in which the share of the population that has reached or 
passed retirement age has the most rapid growth.  
 
In view of the ongoing demographic development, the declining number of young 
people obviously has a direct effect on the education system. The compulsory 
primary  and  secondary  levels  of  education  (the  first  nine  years  of  school)  is 
already affected by these changes and the decline in the number of school-age 
children will accelerate in the coming years. The next level to be affected will be 
the non-compulsory upper secondary level of education (Sekundarstufe II).  At 
these two levels, the decline in the number of  students cannot realistically be 
compensated for by increasing the schooling rate. Even at the non-compulsory 
upper secondary level of education, the schooling rate of the current cohorts is 
almost 90%. At the tertiary level, predictions are somewhat more difficult to make 
because there is still some potential for increasing participation due to the still 
relatively  low  percentage  of  academics  in  the  population  compared  to  other 




This paper examines only the compulsory education level because, on the one 
hand, this level is already affected by a declining number of pupils and, on the 
other hand, because it will experience the greatest decline in pupils during the 
coming ten years. Another reason is the data on education finance pertaining to 
the basic primary and secondary levels is the relatively best qualitative data on the 
Swiss education system and therefore a limitation to the period of compulsory 
education is appropriate.  
 
 
                                                 
1  The  EU  (EU  Economic  Policy  Committee  2003,  pp.  15-16)  projects  that  the  demographic 
savings in the basic primary and secondary school levels will be offset by increasing participation 
at the upper secondary and tertiary levels of education.    4 
Overview of the literature 
 
The literature on the issue of the effects of demographic change on education 
finance can be divided into two groups. The first group analyzes how educational 
spending varies in response to a change in the number of pupils, while the second 
group  specifically  examines  the  potential  competition  between  the  elderly  and 
younger segments of the population for public financial resources. Demographic 
change gives rise to such competition because the relative weightings of these age 
groups will undergo a fundamental shift in favor of the elderly age group as the 
demographic transition runs its course.  
 
Reactions in terms of educational production 
The  educational  system  is  slow  to  adapt  cyclical  fluctuations  in  school-going 
population,  as  has  been  observed  time  and  again.
2  A  typical  indicator  of  this 
phenomenon in the educational system can be seen with regard to fluctuations in 
class sizes. In response to fluctuating numbers of pupils, the existing input factors 
(in this case, the number of teachers) are initially held constant as long as possible 
while the number of pupils per teacher increases or decreases. To a certain extent, 
this delay in adapting to changes in pupil numbers makes sound economic sense. 
The  key  input  factors  in  the  educational  system,  i.e.,  teachers  and  school 
buildings, cannot adapt quickly to short-term fluctuations without major expense. 
Buildings  that  meet  the  specific  needs  of  pupils  cannot  be  sold  or  purchased 
overnight. As far as the teacher component is concerned, teachers are specialist 
employees who have completed a long period of training and cannot easily be 
integrated into other sectors and professions in the broader economy. This means 
that a short-term increase in demand for teachers can only be accommodated in 
the medium-term by training new people or headhunting on the job market. Nor is 
firing teachers a useful reaction in response to a decline in the number of pupils; it 
would  be  difficult  to  re-recruit  the  dismissed  teachers  at  short  notice  when 
demand for educators rises again. The associated inelastic adaptation processes 
with regard to the input factors was shown for instance by Baum & Seitz (2003) 
in their analysis of educational spending by western German federal states. These 
investigations showed that human resource spending in the educational system 
(most  of  which  goes  to  pay  teachers’  salaries)  shows  little  response  to 
demographic changes. This inelasticity (corroborated by Kemkes & Seitz 2005) 
may be fiscally welcome when school-age populations are growing but, by the 
same token, the potential to reduce spending is lost when schoolgoer numbers 
decline for structural reasons. 
 
In  addition to these inelasticities pertaining to the input factors in educational 
production, there is empirical evidence indicating that there is indeed a tendency 
(see for example Falch & Rattso 1996) to re-channel the resources freed up by a 
declining  school-age  population  for  consumption  elsewhere  in  the  educational 
system.  This  automatically  increases  the  overall  cost  of  education  per  pupil, 
which  –  if  looking  at  the  scant  literature  demonstrating  a  positive  correlation 
                                                 
2 Hanushek & Rifkin (1997)’s calculations for the USA show for instance that the number of 
school-age children in that country declined by five million in the period from 1970 to 1990, while 
educational spending did not decline despite a shortage of public funds, automatically resulting in 
a steady increase in spending per student.     5 
between school resources and student performance
3 – generally serves to promote 
further inefficiencies in the educational system.  
 
Competition for public funds 
Compulsory schooling in Switzerland is funded almost entirely from the public 
purse,  so  spending  is  subject  to  a  democratic  decision-making  process.  The 
amount  of  funding  allocated  to  the  public  sector  is  not  the  only  decision  of 
relevance.  A  perhaps  more  interesting  issue  is  the  distribution  process 
determining the percentage of public funding allocated for particular purposes. 
Unlike  the  situation  in  other  countries,  Switzerland’s  tradition  of  direct 
democracy allows enfranchised citizens to vote on specific items of the public 
budget. 
 
More  than  a  decade’s  worth  of  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  has  been 
published  on  the  potential  conflict  between  older  and  younger  sectors  of  the 
population with regard to the allocation of public funds (see South 1991 or Hoyt 
& Toma 1993 in the early 90s). Poterba (1996, 1997 & 1998) pointed out very 
early however that this relationship is so complex that theoretical models are not a 
reliable basis for accurate outcome prediction (see also Gradstein & Kaganovich 
2003).  
 
Based on the assumption that a voter in a democratic decision-making process is 
likely to try and push his or her own interests, it would seem logical to guess that 
a  continuous  increase  in  the  age  of  the  median  voter  would  tend  to  have  a 
negative  impact  on  education  finance.  This  model  of  course  assumes  that  the 
various generations involved in the decision-making process will each act based 
on total self-interest and differ in their preferences. The higher number of voters 
that stand to gain no direct (and short-term) benefit from educating the younger 
generation would, therefore, prefer to use public funds for purposes other than 
education.  
 
The  fact  that  the  median  voter  is  getting  older  and  is  very  likely  to  have 
preferences  differing  from  those  of  young  parents,  for  instance,  does  not 
necessarily mean however that spending on education will suffer. The literature 
provides four main reasons why an aging population does not necessarily result in 
a reduction in the average spending per pupil:  
 
(1)  The  existence  of  positive  intergenerational  externalities  might  produce  an 
effect whereby the older population has a stake in a well-educated population 
whose higher productivity is essential in financing transfer benefits (old age 
pension, healthcare system, etc.), the greatest beneficiaries of which are the 
elderly.
4 This primary argument is based on the rationale that even a purely 
                                                 
3 A large empirical database in economics of education exists, from Hanushek (1986), Card & 
Krueger (1996) to Wössmann (2003). 
4 Social returns from individual educational investments are not even absolutely necessary. It is 
sufficient to have a generation contract in the pension system whereby pensions received by the 
retired population from the employed population are consciously or implicitly co-determined by 
the economic performance of the employed population.   6 
egoistical voter will not tend to lower spending on education because that 
would undermine his or her own interests. This line of argument assumes that 
the median voter both understands this relationship and that his actions are 
not  solely  based  on  thoughts  of  short-term  gain.
5  However,  the  latter  is  a 
strong  argument  against  this  view  considering  that  older  voters  are  more 
likely  to  be  interested  in  the  short-term  rather  than  the  long-term 
consequences of their behavior, given their shorter life expectancy.   
(2)  If there is a kind of intergenerational altruism that more or less ensures that 
older people feel bound by a generational contract, the elderly would enable 
the  young  generation  to  enjoy  the  same  funding  that  was  afforded  to 
themselves during their own youth. The only question here is the particular 
variable to which this solidarity would apply: per capita educational spending 
or educational spending per pupil (see also Argument 4)? 
(3)  US studies in particular indicate a positive correlation between the quality of 
schooling  and  housing  prices.
6  On  the  basis  of  this  frequently  observed 
relationship,  it  might  be  assumed  that  older  citizens  (many  of  whom  are 
property  owners)  would  try  to  maintain  the  value  of  their  property  by 
supporting  spending  on  education.  This  argument  is  based  on  the 
circumstance that the today’s property market is dominated by newcomers to 
an area, who are likely to have school-age children and therefore be prepared 
to pay higher property prices in order to secure a higher-quality education for 
their offspring. It is uncertain whether this argument will continue to apply in 
future,  when,  due  to  demographic  aging,  more  and  more  potential 
homebuyers will not have school-age children and will therefore not take the 
quality of the local schools into consideration when deciding where to buy a 
new home. 
(4)  Finally, there is also a line of reasoning based on the argument that the elderly 
population is not usually interested in how much is spent per pupil, being 
more interested in how much is spent on the educational system in general. It 
is possible that the elderly population would accept a rise in the amount spent 
per pupil. In this context it is conceivable that there would still be sufficient 
financial resources available to satisfy the interests of the elderly population 
because the sums spent on education would be on the decline in any case due 
to the decline in the numbers of pupils. However, the sharp increase in public 
interest in the economic efficiency of education over the past few years and 
the increased criticism levied at the high level of spending (per pupil) would 
tend to go against this argument. 
 
                                                 
5 Konrad (1995) and Kemnitz (1999 & 2000) put forward this argument, for example. 
6  Harris  et  al.  (2001)  use  this  argument  to  explain  their  empirical  results,  which  identified  a 
negative impact of the number of senior citizens on educational spending at State-level but no 
negative impact on local (County) educational spending. Declining spending at local level would 
have more of a negative impact on property prices than spending at State-level. Harris et al. (2001) 
uses this argument to try and reconcile the different results of Poterba (1998) and Ladd & Murray 
(2001). The same distinction between local and State-level spending is used also by Baldson & 
Brunner (2003).    7 
Another potential area of rivalry exists between various interest groups whose 
differences are not necessarily based on age. Baum and Seitz (2003), for instance, 
investigated the hypothesis that increased social welfare spending competes with 
spending on education. The assumption is that, when public finances are strained, 
a  sharp  increase  in  public  spending  in  one  area  (due  to  unemployment  or 
disability  insurance  payments,  for  example)  automatically  reduces  the  funds 
available for other areas of spending.  
 
The empirical part of this paper evaluates also rivalries between various ethnic 
groups  and  the  resulting impact  on  educational  spending,  which  is  an  area  of 
research that has been dealt with extensively in the US literature. Our analysis in 
this paper is based on the ratio of nationals to non-nationals among the residential 
population.  
 
The  following  general  conclusions  can  be  derived  from  the  available 
theoretical/empirical  literature.  Firstly,  virtually  all  studies  indicate  that 
educational systems are slow to react to changes in the student population. This 
produces  certain  cost-containing  benefits  during  periods  of  expansion,  but  no 
proportional reduction in educational spending in response to a structural decline 
in the numbers of incoming pupils. However, savings should still be possible even 
in the absence of a proportional decline in spending per individual schoolgoer. 
Nevertheless, some studies do show that some players in the educational system 
manage to retain these savings by spending the freed-up amounts elsewhere in the 
educational  system.  There  need  not  necessarily  be  an  increase  in  educational 
spending  per  head  of  the  population,  but  the  spending  per  pupil  increases 
significantly as a result. It is uncertain therefore whether the potential savings on 
educational spending arising out of declining numbers of pupils will actually be 
realized. 
The  impact  the  increasing  percentage  of  seniors  in  a  demographically  aging 
society  has  on  educational  spending  is  unclear  both  in  theory  and  based  on 
observation.  Authors  basing  their  analyses  on  rational  behavior  of  an  (aging) 
median voter conclude from their assumptions that an aging society would not 
have a negative impact on educational spending. However, two assumptions are 
of essential importance in this line of argument. The first is that the median voter 
interprets  the  correlation  between  educational  spending  and  his  or  her  own 
personal benefit as meaning that a reduction in educational spending would also 
reduce his or her personal benefit. This means that is it assumed that the median 
voter  sees  a  relationship between  educational  spending  and  the  human  capital 
stock  available  to  an  economy.  However,  the  very  existence  of  any  such 
relationship is in fact controversial, even in economics of education. Secondly, it 
is also important to remember that, given the constant flow of public funds, the 
resources  that  are  used  for  education  will  basically  not  be  available  for  other 
government  areas.  In  other  words,  the  median  voter  will  not  say  yes  to 
educational  spending  unless  the  personal  marginal  benefit  of  spending  on 
education is deemed to be greater than the marginal benefits derived from other 
government activities.  
   8 
Previous Swiss studies  
Related  studies  conducted  in  Switzerland  to  date  dealt  primarily  with  the 
disposition of total public spending, i.e. spending on education was not always the 
main focus of the respective analyses. Most of the exogenous variables studied 
were  variables  associated  with  the  political  process.  Vatter  &  Freitag  (2002), 
Freitag & Bühlemann (2003) and Schaltegger & Feld (2004) mainly studied the 
impact  of  federalism,  concordance  and  direct  democracy  on  public  spending. 
Demographic  influences  received  very  little  attention  in  these  analyses.  The 
authors  also  based  the  framework  of  their  analysis  of  factors  determining 
educational spending on the factors determining society’s willingness to pay for 
education.  Hence,  per  capita  public  spending  on  education  was  defined  as  a 
dependent variable. This analysis almost entirely neglects the fact that educational 
production  develops  its  own  dynamics  to  a  certain  extent.  This  means  that 
educational  spending  is  determined  not  only  by  political  decision-making 
processes concerning the quantity and use of public funds, but is also affected by 
the  characteristics  of  the  school  children  and  the  educational  production 
environment  (e.g.,  also  through  the  impact  of  teachers’  unions,  etc.).  For  this 
reason  (cf.  next  section),  both  total  spending  on  the  educational  system  and 
average spending per pupil are construed as dependent variables in this paper. 
 
  
Hypotheses, objectives and methods 
 
The  previous  section  showed  that  many  of  the  issues  pertaining  to  the 
determination of educational spending cannot be answered in theory but only on 
the basis of empirical observation, if indeed at all. It is therefore impossible to 
formulate  definite,  clear-cut  hypotheses  on  the  relationships  and  interactions 
between individual variables and educational spending. 
 
Objectives 
There are two key issues in this paper, as already mentioned. The first issue of 
interest is to establish how educational spending is going to respond to declining 
numbers of school-age children in the wake of demographic change. The second 
issue of interest is whether the concomitant increase in the percentage of retired 
people will affect society’s willingness to spend money on education. As a basis 
for empirical investigation of these two issues, four groups of variables will be 
used in the models to be estimated. The purpose of these four groups of variables 
is  to  enable  an  analysis of  the  effect  of  pupil  numbers  and  percentage  of  the 
elderly population on educational spending controlling for variables that also have 
an effect on educational spending. The four groups of exogenous variables are as 
follows: 
 
The first assumption is that the composition of the population in a Canton has an 
impact  on  educational  spending.  Both  composition  in  terms  of  age,  and 
composition in terms of country of origin of the residents are taken into account. 
As  already  mentioned,  the  effect  of  the  percentage  of  seniors  on  educational 
spending is unclear and may go either way. Nor is it easy to determine the effect 
of the percentage of non-nationals on educational spending. The US studies in the 
literature often argue (and confirmatory data is provided in some cases; see for   9 
example  Alesina  et  al.  1999)  that  a  high  percentage  of  non-whites  in  the 
population  has  a  negative  impact  on  educational  spending  because  the  white 
population is less keen to spend in this situation. On the other hand, we know that 
in Switzerland a high percentage of non-national pupils (most of whom have other 
mother tongues) leads to an increase in educational spending because these young 
people have a greater need for supplementary educational offerings. On the one 
hand, therefore, it is possible that the national population may be unwilling to 
allocate the same public resources to the non-national (non-voting, non-electable) 
population; on the other hand, we know that non-national pupils trigger higher 
investment in education from an educational production viewpoint. We would 
therefore tend to assume (in contrast to the US data) that a high percentage of 
non-nationals  in  the  residential  population  would  tend  to  increase  educational 
spending.  
Based  on  this  hypothesis,  we  used  an  additional  variable  inspired  by  Poterba 
(1996). This variable subtracts the over-65 (retired) non-national population from 
the  under-17  (school-age)  percentage  of  the  non-national  population.  The 
principle  behind  this  variable  is  that,  the  higher  it  is,  then  the  greater  the 
concentration  of  school-age  young  people  in  the  non-national  population.  As 
such, one  would expect to see a decline in the trend toward high  educational 
spending among the domestic population (or, with reference to the US, the white 
population).  However,  it  is  important  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  this 
“heterogeneity”  variable  correlates  closely  with  the  variable  regarding  the 
percentage of non-nationals in the residential population (0.74). Nevertheless, the 
model is useful for investigating whether the percentage of non-nationals is the 
sole relevant factor or whether the age mix is also of relevance.   
  
  Second, our estimations control for differences in the parliamentary structures in 
the  various  Cantons.  Our  choice  of  variables  is  based  on  political  science 
literature. As with the other variables, the direction of the effect of these variables 
on educational spending is definite in very few cases.  
The government structure variables on the Cantonal level are the number of ruling 
political parties and their strength (based on the percentage of votes received in 
recent elections). There is virtually no correlation between the two variables, i.e., 
the cumulative percent of the vote obtained by the ruling parties is not affected by 
the  number  of  parties  participating  in  the  government.  It  is  assumed  that 
governments  comprising  multiple  parties  must  accommodate  diverse  interests 
(consensus decisions) and therefore are more likely to have large state budgets 
(see Freitag & Bühlmann 2003). It is unclear however whether the trend toward 
high public spending must automatically result in more being spent on education. 
It is by all means possible that accommodating multiple interests might lead to a 
situation  where  the  item  traditionally  accorded  the  greatest  importance 
(education)  is  used  more  frequently  as  a  compensating  variable  in  Cantonal 
budgets, with the result that consensus governments would tend to spend less on 
education in absolute terms. Furthermore, it is not clear from the outset whether 
strong governments (as measured by their percent of the vote) are prepared to 
spend more or less money on education.  
 
  Thirdly, the financial resources of the Cantons are included in the analysis. It is 
assumed  that  there  is  positive  income  elasticity  with  regard  to  spending  on   10 
education, i.e., richer Cantons will spend more on education for the simple reason 
that they have greater tax revenues. A Canton’s economic status is expressed in 
the per capita gross domestic product.  
 
  Fourthly, our analysis controls for three variables that are commonly used in 
similar  empirical  literature.  The  unemployment  rate  in  a  Canton  is  used  as  a 
marker for potential competition between educational spending and other public 
spending  on  social  welfare.  A  high  unemployment  rate  would  therefore  be 
expected to constrain spending on education. The percentage of students attending 
the academic track (Gymnasium) in upper secondary level of education is also 
taken into account. We use this control variable to verify whether Cantons with a 
high percentage of students attending the academic track in upper secondary level 
of education would for that reason already spend more at the lower secondary 
level  of  education  (Sekundarstufe  I).
7  Finally,  our  analysis  also  controls  for  a 
Canton’s  average  degree  of  urbanicity.  This  variable  can  be  used  to  express 
various  interactions  that  are  difficult  to  explain  later  with  a  single  specific 
hypothesis.  Although  urban  centers  are  associated  with  lower  spending  on 
education because of their typically efficient school and class size, they may also 
be expected to spend more on education for other reasons. The main such reason 
is the parents’ educational background, which is higher in urban centers than in 
rural  areas.  This  is  due  among  other  things  to  the  fact  that  the  diversity  of 
education available at the upper levels of schooling is better developed in urban 
centers,  which  in  turn  influences  highly  qualified  parents  in  their  choice  of 
address. Hence, it is legitimate to assume that parents in urban areas have both 
higher educational aspirations and a greater appreciation of the rewards a good 
education brings. This, in turn, suggests that the median voter in an urban center 
will have and assert a greater preference for allocating funds to education.  
 
Methods 
The empirical part below contains panel estimates that take advantage of the fact 
that authority for education rests with the individual Cantons. This circumstance 
coupled with a fairly high degree of Cantonal freedom in fiscal policy  affairs 
suggests that Cantons are at liberty to independently decide how much they want 
to  spend  on  the  educational  system.  This  allows  us  to  investigate  changes  in 
educational spending not only as a function of time but also as a cross-section of 
the  individual  Cantons.  As  in  the  USA,  this  enables  the  observer  to  estimate 
structural and institutional effects within a fairly narrow time window on the basis 
of a large number of observations. 26 Cantons over a period of 13 years (1990-
2002) gives a panel of 338 observations. The estimates include dummy variables 
to represent fixed effects for all Cantons and all years of observation. 
The first panel models using average spending per pupil as a dependent variable 
estimate effects on the amount spent both in cross-section and longitudinally per 
pupil. This type of estimation helps to identify the factors that impact on how 
much  an  education  system  is  willing  or  able  to  spend  per  pupil.  However,  a 
different model is employed to investigate how changes in the numbers of pupils 
                                                 
7  A  disadvantage  of  this  variable  was  that  the  relevant  data  was  missing  for  one  canton. 
Nevertheless, calculations using this variable were carried out for the remaining 25 cantons. The 
variable proved non-significant, however, prompting a decision not to include this variable in the 
empirical data shown.   11 
and in the number of retired people impact total spending on education. To obtain 
a clearer picture of the demographic factors influencing spending on education, 
we use a model specifying all variables as first differences. The differences in 
each case refer to a three-year interval. An interval of three years is recommended 
because (as argued by Baum & Seit 2003) annual changes would not reveal large 
enough variations in the data. An interval longer than three years is unsuitable too 
because the number of observations would be greatly reduced. The first difference 
model leaves four observation points with 26 Cantons in each case, resulting in a 
maximum number of 104 observations. The individual periods of time are used as 





Dependent variables (spending on education) 
When specifying the dependent variables, a number of decisions were necessary 
that  automatically  mean  that  the  present  study  is  comparable  with  the  Swiss 
papers cited in the foregoing to a limited extent only. For instance, the method 
used to calculate educational spending is not fully standardized and identical in all 
Cantons.
8 To maximize comparability as far as possible, three limitations were 
introduced: Firstly, educational spending was analyzed only for the compulsory 
school level (primary and lower secondary schools). This data displays the highest 
degree of comparability between the Cantons, and structural differences can be 
offset to a large extent on the basis of the use of fixed effects for each individual 
Canton. Furthermore, limiting the data to the compulsory school level makes it 
easier to interpret the results, as there is no need to take account of the different 
educational system structures between the various Cantons at the upper secondary 
level of education and at the tertiary level.
9 Secondly, the total current expenditure 
of the Canton and the local governments for the primary and lower secondary 
schools was calculated without investment expenditures. Investment expenditure 
profiles are too erratic to be compared in any meaningful sense as a function of 
time and between the Cantons. Thirdly, we limited ourselves to the post-1990 
period  while  the  cited  older  Swiss  studies  also  included  the  1980s  in  their 
analysis. A shorter observation period was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the  comparability  and  quality  of  pre-1990  data  are  fairly  poor  because  it  is 
impossible to distinguish between current expenditure and capital spending in the 
period before 1990. Furthermore, the demographic profile in the 1980s was not 
yet  characterized  by  an  aging  society  and  declining  numbers  of  school-age 
children; instead, the 1980s figures reflect vigorous immigration. As a result, the 
1980s  would  not  be  representative  for  the  subsequent  period  thereafter.  The 
                                                 
8 The figures are from the Swiss Federal Department of Finance. Minor adjustments were made to 
the data from two cantons because specific deviations in the data generation methods would have 
compromised comparison with the other cantons.  
9 Educational systems differ greatly between the individual cantons at upper secondary level of 
education in terms of their structure and specializations, for example as regards the design and 
uptake  of  vocational  training  vs.  general  education  specializations.  These  different  forms  and 
educational traditions are in some cases a matter of different cultures. They are cost-relevant and 
difficult to offset using dummy variables. At the tertiary level, very different traditions between 
the cantons with regard to universities, institutes of technology, universities of applied sciences 
and teacher training colleges would have to have been taken into account.    12 
advantage  of  1990-2002  as  an  observation  period,  in  comparison,  is  that  our 
analysis can integrate both a period characterized by rising numbers of school-age 
children and the start of a period marked by declining numbers of pupils.  
 
Ladd & Murray (2001) criticized Poterba’s empirical studies (1998) by saying 
that the latter applied his data at State-level and asserting that investigations at the 
lower  government  level  (County-level)  would  have  produced  different  results. 
Education  spending  figures  at  local  government  level  would  only  have  been 
available  on  an  aggregate  basis  in  our  study.  Therefore,  analysis  at  municipal 
government level would not have been possible even if it had been desired. This 
limitation is not a fundamental problem in the current case, however. Although 
the  specific  decision-making  processes  differ  from  Canton  to  Canton,  it  is 
legitimate to assume, for the sake of simplification, that most decisions relating to 
educational spending are made on a Cantonal level and are merely implemented at 
municipal  government  level.  Hence,  the  Cantons  would  be  the  right  level  of 
aggregation for analysis in Switzerland’s case. 
 
Independent variables 
Unless otherwise stated, all data is taken from official Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office figures. Other sources had to be used for the variables pertaining to the 
political system, however.
10 Other data of the kind included in some other studies, 
such as the Local Government Autonomy Index, were not used if the data was 
generated only once during the period of study or would not be meaningful at the 
Cantonal  level  of  aggregation.  In  such  cases,  the  variables  would  point  to 
politically based structural differences between the Cantons but there would be no 
likely specific correlation with the dependent variables analyzed here.   
The degree of urbanicity was calculated from census data from 1990 and 2000. 
The values between 1990 and 2000 were determined by linear extrapolation. 
The variable “strength of governing parties” was defined as the percent of the 
vote obtained by the governing political parties in Cantonal government elections.  
 
 
Empirical results  
 
Determination of spending on education per student  
The first step is to estimate factors determining average spending on education for 
a child of compulsory school age. Model 1 includes all independent variables 
while model 2 contains only the significant variables from the first estimation.  
 
The  results  show  that  the  percent  of  retired  people  of  the  population  has  a 
negative impact on average spending on education per pupil, albeit only at a 10% 
level  of  significance.  The  percentage  of  non-nationals  among  the  residential 
population,  the  national  income  by  Canton  and  per  capita,  and  degree  of 
urbanicity  correlate  positively  with  spending,  however.  In  other  words,  the 
analysis shows that, in contrast to certain US studies, a large number of non-
                                                 
10 The figures pertaining to percents of the vote and numbers of governing parties are taken from 
various issues of the publication entitled "Année Politique Suisse".    13 
national  pupils
11  results  in  more  being  spent  on  education  per  pupil.  This  is 
probably due to higher spending on integration. Integration costs are particularly 
high among children with a different mother tongue and among children whose 
parents  have  low  educational  qualifications.  Because  of  Switzerland’s  past 
migration  policy  migrants  with  low  educational  qualifications  had  been  the 
preferred immigrants for a long period of time. The positive income elasticity 
shows that richer Cantons also spend more on education per pupil. Our figures do 
not reveal whether this outcome is due only to structural differences between the 
Cantons  or  whether  the  same  result  would  emerge  in  the  case  of  changes  in 
Cantonal  income  in  one  particular  Canton.  Given  that  Cantonal  income  is  no 
longer significant in the first-difference model, this effect is probably attributable 
to higher overall prices and incomes in the richer Cantons. What can be concluded 
without doubt is that the input prices in the educational process are reflected in 
higher spending on education in rich Cantons, but there is no hard evidence that 
more inputs are invested in quantitative terms.  
 
Table 1:  Determination  of  educational  spending  per  pupil  (1990-2002)
  Dependent variable: educational spending per pupil (log) 
  Panel estimations (generalized least squares)  
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Independent variables  Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Percentage of retired  -0.0145*  0.0081  -0.0141*  0.0082 
Percentage of non-nationals  0.0376***  0.0084  0.0326***  0.0062 
Per capita Cantonal income  0.0021**  0.0009  0.0021**  0.0009 
Unemployment rate  0.0009  0.0036     
Degree of urbanicity  0.0028**  0.0012  0.0026**  0.0012 
No. of governing parties  -0.0120*  0.0068  -0.0118**  0.0060 
Strength of governing parties  0.0000  0.0004     
Heterogeneity of the population  -0.0033  0.0043     
National language (1=German)  -0.0997  0.0915     
No. of observations  338    338   
Log likelihood  745.95    748.36   
Autocorrelation (AR1 term)  0.5957    0.6219   
*, **, *** stand for levels of significance of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All estimates estimated with fixed 
effects for Cantons and years. Panel estimates control for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Per 
capita Cantonal income in CHF 1,000.  
                                                 
11 The percentage of non-national school children correlates very closely with the non-national 
residential population (0.94). Non-national residential population was included in the calculations 
to ensure that the same variables are used in both models, i.e. also in the first difference model. It 
would not have been possible to use the percentage of non-national school children in the first 
difference model because this number would have been multicolinear to the overall number of 
school children. Calculations based on the percentage of non-national pupils produce qualitatively 
identical results to those obtained using the non-national residential population as the variable in 
determining average spending per pupil.   14 
While the strength of the governing parties seems to have no effect on educational 
spending, the number of governing parties has a negative effect.
12 In keeping with 
the  hypothesis  as  formulated,  this  means  that  a  greater  compulsion  toward 
achieving consensus solutions and hence accommodating the interests of many 
particular interests has a negative effect on the educational budget above all else.  
 
Determining changes in overall spending on education 
Our second model uses a panel with first differences. All variables are included in 
the regression in the analysis of absolute change between year t and t-3.  This form 
of  analysis  should  be  particularly  suitable  for  estimating  how  spending  on 
education reacts in response to demographic changes. The results show only the 
coefficients of the significant variables. A dummy was used as a control variable 
for the Canton of Geneva, which was significant in all calculations. The other 
Canton dummies were also tested but were not statistically significant. Inclusion 
of the dummy for the Canton of Geneva has no appreciable effect on the other 
coefficients,  however.  Furthermore,  one  observation  was  excluded  from  the 
calculations
13 because it was an obvious outlier with no apparent explanation. 
  
Table 2:  Determination of changes in educational spending  
   (1990-2002): Dependent variable: educational spending (t-3 – t) 
  Panel estimations (generalized least squares)  
 
Independent variables  Coefficient  Std. Err.  95% Conf. Interval  . 
∆ number of pupils  7181.24***  2179.25  2909.99  11452.5 
∆ number of retirees  -4036.70***  1517.64  -7011.214  -1062.18 
∆ number of non-nationals  3462.54***  764.22  1964.69  4960.39 
Period 93-96  3014597  3244674     
Period 96-99  7795896***  3595090     
Period 99-02  1.21e+07***  3058338     
Canton Geneva  -4.13e+07***  8468780     
Number of observations  103       
Log likelihood  -1745.04       
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  levels  of  significance  of  10,  5  and  1%,  respectively.  Panel  estimates  control  for 
heteroscedasticity.   
 
                                                 
12 It is important to note that, although the percents of the vote correlated positively with average 
spending on education per pupil, they also correlated positively with Cantonal income per capita 
and the percent of non-nationals in the residential population. The results of the estimates should 
be  interpreted  thus:  if  Cantonal  income  per  capita  and  the  percent  of  non-nationals  in  the 
residential population are controlled for, the effect of the governing parties' percent of the vote is 
significantly negative.  
13 This relates to a change in educational spending in the canton of Zurich from 1999 to 2002. Due 
to the 2002 observation, this variable takes on dimensions that can only be attributable to changes 
in the basis of calculation. This observation was excluded in order to avoid falsifying the estimates 
because of this outlier.   15 
One pupil more or less raises or lowers educational spending by approximately 
CHF 7,200. Average spending on education in real terms during the period of 
observation was CHF 12,116
14, however. In other words, the system is inelastic in 
its  response  to  changes  in  the  number  of  students.  If  the  number  of  students 
declines, educational spending does not decline in proportion; the actual reduction 
is only approximately 60% of the average spending per pupil. A phenomenon that 
results in a lowering of the average cost per pupil when the number of pupils 
rises, because marginal cost is lower than average cost, proves to be a cost-driving 





Any forecasts should admittedly be interpreted with caution on the basis of the 
panel calculations shown. They are intended more for the purposes of illustration 
than as a basis for precise predictions of future spending on education. The three 
significant  factors  influencing  spending  on  education  –  number  of  students, 
percentage of non-nationals among the residential population, and percentage of 
retired  people  –  all  have  the  advantage  of  being  represented  in  routine 
demographic scenarios presented by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. We can 
therefore  extrapolate  figures  for  educational  spending  on  the  basis  of  these 
scenarios and the calculated coefficients up to the year 2014. Various calculations 
and conclusions can be achieved. An overall assessment of the model in Table 2 
shows  straight  off  that  educational  spending  for  the  compulsory  period  of 
schooling is set to decline by more than 14% by 2014 in real terms from a high in 
2004. The numbers of students (see Appendix) is set to decline by approximately 
the same level during the same period, i.e. the best forecast for the next ten years 
is  a  proportional  decline  in  educational  spending.  This  in  itself  is  nothing 
spectacular. However, it is important to remember that this predicted decline is 
only partly due to reactions in the educational system itself; it is also partly due to 
the pressure exerted by an aging population on the educational budget. Estimates 
based on a ceteris paribus assumption (e.g., in this case assuming no change in 
the percentage of retired persons in the population as a whole) (see Graph 1) show 
that the reduction in spending on the basis of declining numbers of school-age 
children  (mitigated  by  the  increasing  percent  of  non-nationals  among  the 
residential  population)  would  be  far  short  of  a  proportional  decline.  In  other 
words, the educational system obviously saves much more due to the exogenous 
pressure on the educational budget than it would if it were to adapt to changes in 
the numbers of school-age children with the same (in)elasticity as in former years.  
 
Interesting features are also brought to light by simulations whereby the average 
coefficients applicable to Switzerland are linked with Cantonal predictions for 
numbers  of  pupils,  non-nationals  and  retirees.  The  appendix  contains  two 
projected forecasts for the Cantons of Berne and Zurich for illustrative purposes. 
Comparison of the two Cantons shows that Cantons (Zurich in this case) come 
under much greater pressure to adapt if the numbers of school-age children do not 
decline  sharply  during  the  forecast  period  while  the  percentage  of  seniors 
                                                 
14 The 95% confidence interval is also below the mean.   16 
increases. In this instance, political pressure on the educational budget is likely to 
force educational policymakers and administrators to save even more money than 
might possibly have been saved by a proportional decline in spending. In other 
words, so much pressure will be brought to bear that the average cost per pupil 
must decline in response to that pressure. The logical conclusion is that Cantons 
with a very high percentage of seniors in relation to the decline in the number of 
pupils may see a disproportionate reduction in spending.  
 
 
Graph 1:   Educational spending in Switzerland (forecast 2004-2014)
15 
 
In contrast, the Canton of Berne can offset part of the budget pressure from the 
senior population thanks to a declining school-going population. However, in the 
same manner as for the total Swiss average, the Canton will be forced to cut costs 
on a proportional basis, i.e. to cut its current average amount of spending per 
pupil, which the Canton has probably not done in the past. The hope of budgetary 
relief through a decline in the school-age population, a so-called “demographic 





The  present  paper  estimated  the  factors  exerting  an  influence  on  the  average 
amount of educational spending per pupil and the changes in overall education 
finance over time by means of a panel of Swiss Cantons. There are, with respect 
to the study objectives, two advantages of the data set utilized. First, the system of 
                                                 
15 The production function effect keeps the number of retirees constant and only estimates the 
influence  of  the  number  of  pupils  and  non-nationals  on  educational  spending.  The  older 
population effect estimates educational spending with all other effects constant and the estimation 













Production function effect (ceteris paribus)
Estimation of all effects
Older population effect (ceteris paribus)  17 
fiscal  and  educational  federalism  in  Switzerland  allows  panel  estimates  with 
numerous  observations  to  be  made,  which,  in  turn,  allows  the  influence  of 
institutional factors and demographic patterns to be estimated quite well. Second, 
the  period  of  observation  (1990-2002)  encompasses  demographic  patterns  that 
can, at least in a basic sense, be considered representative of future patterns. The 
influence of an aging population and a declining number of school-age children 
can therefore be estimated based not only on the different proportions within the 
cross-section of the Cantons. 
 
The key findings of the calculations are summarized as follows: Consistent with 
international  evidence,  educational  spending  exhibits  a  significantly  inelastic 
response to variations in the number of pupils. This has a positive effect when the 
school-age population is growing yet is problematic during times of a structurally 
induced  decline  in  the  number  of  pupils.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  likely  that 
educational spending will subside only very slowly in the future. This is because 
of  the  significant  and  highly  negative  influence  of  the  elderly  population  on 
education budgets that has been observed. A possible explanation for the strong 
influence of elderly citizens on education finance in Switzerland – despite mixed 
international evidence on this issue – could be the fact that Swiss citizens have a 
considerable  voice  in  how  public  funds  are  spent  due  to  the  country’s  deeply 
rooted tradition of direct democracy.  
 
If the study findings are corroborated going forward, then the education system 
will be forced to make much deeper cuts in spending than it would have otherwise 
made voluntarily as judged by historical evidence. Furthermore, in some Cantons 
education  finance  is  likely  to  decline  not  only  in  proportion  to  the  decline  in 
school-age children but at a proportionally slightly faster rate. In other words, 
even the average real amount of spending per student will have to be reduced. 
This will present the education system with completely new challenges. Up to 
now  the  education  system’s  main  problem  was  its  inability  to  translate  the 
increasing average amount of spending per pupil into overall greater efficiency. 
The absence of such correlation between resources and outputs led to structural 
efficiency  problems  within  education  systems,  especially  in  highly  developed 
countries. Now education systems will have to demonstrate, however, that they 
are capable of dealing with a reduction in resources without sacrificing efficiency. 
This will be no easy task for, just as more inputs do not automatically lead to 
more output, it is not certain whether a reduction in inputs will not be without 
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Variables  Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
Spending on education in 
millions  330  355  17.6 (AI 90)  1720 (ZH 02) 
Number of pupils  26,887  26,457  1,569 (AI 90)  108,573 (ZH 
01) 
Education spending per pupil  11,602  1,784  8,820 (UR 90)  19,777 (GE 90) 
AHV pensioners (in %)  15.74  2.18  11.33 (ZG 90)  22.88 (BS 01) 
Non-national residential 
population (in %)  17.11  6.52  6.07 (NW 90)  37.96 (GE 95) 
Heterogeneity  (in %)  14.26  6.06  1.40 (NW 90)  33.45 (BS 96) 
Unemployment rate (in %)  2.70  1.88  0 (UR/AI 90)  7.8 (GE/TI 97) 
Cantonal income per capita   44,898  10,148  28,887 (JU 95)  87,388 (BS 00) 
Degree of urbanicity (in %)  58.56  30.80  0 
(UR/OW/GL/AI)  100 (BS 90-02) 
No. of ruling political parties  3.36  0.93  1 (AI 90-98) 
5 (ZH 89-01, 
ZG 98-01, BS 
89-95, VD 94-
01, GE 97-00) 
Strength of ruling political 









Descriptive statistics for the variables applied in the projections  
  Change from 2003-2014 in percent (Basis: 2003) 
  Mean*  Std. Dev.*  Minimum  Maximum 
Number of pupils  -16.39  9.14  71.69 (SH)  105.06 (GE) 
Over-65s  21.75  10.22  95.45 (BS)  147.28 (NW) 
Non-national residential 
population  6.20  7.07  93.67 (UR)  123.57 (AI) 
  Values for the change in Switzerland:   
Number of pupils  -13.24   
Over-65s  6.47   
Non-national residential 
population  21.23   
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